Colloquium by Jonathan D. Payton: Common sense vs. revisionary metaphysics: The case of mereological essentialism

Jonathan D. Payton (Assistant Professor, Bilkent University) will present his paper ‘Common sense vs. revisionary metaphysics: The case of mereological essentialism’ to the Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium at 17:00 on Friday the 17th of November.

Abstract: Mereological essentialism (ME) is the thesis that every part of a whole is essential to it: necessarily, no composite object can have, or could have had, any parts other than the ones it has. While ME provides a tidy solution to several metaphysical puzzles, it’s often dismissed on grounds of obvious falsehood. Sometimes, these dismissals are backed by a broadly Moorean methodology which tells us not to accept any metaphysical view which departs “too much” from “common sense”. This Moorean methodology can be articulated in many different ways. Some of these are more defensible than others. None is successful when wielded as an argument against ME. Moreover, attempts to save our common-sense judgments about the persistence of composite objects risk putting other common-sense judgments in jeopardy, and so they also risk sanction by the Moorean method. None of this shows that ME is true. But it’s not as bad as you might think.

Location: Boğaziçi University, South Campus, Bebek, Istanbul. - John Freely Hall, JF 507